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Abstract
Dynamic taint analysis is a well-known information flow
analysis problem with many possible applications. Taint
tracking allows for analysis of application data flow by
assigning labels to inputs, and then propagating those la-
bels through data flow. Taint tracking systems traditionally
compromise among performance, precision, accuracy, and
portability. Performance can be critical, as these systems
are typically intended to be deployed with software, and
hence must have low overhead. To be deployed in security-
conscious settings, taint tracking must also be accurate and
precise. Dynamic taint tracking must be portable in order
to be easily deployed and adopted for real world purposes,
without requiring recompilation of the operating system or
language interpreter, and without requiring access to appli-
cation source code.
We present PHOSPHOR, a dynamic taint tracking sys-
tem for the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) that simultane-
ously achieves our goals of performance, accuracy, pre-
cision, and portability. Moreover, to our knowledge, it is
the first portable general purpose taint tracking system for
the JVM. We evaluated PHOSPHOR’s performance on two
commonly used JVM languages (Java and Scala), on two
versions of two commonly used JVMs (Oracle’s HotSpot
and OpenJDK’s IcedTea) and on Android’s Dalvik Virtual
Machine, finding its performance to be impressive: as low
as 3% (53% on average), using the DaCapo macro bench-
mark suite. This paper describes the approach that PHOS-
PHOR uses to achieve portable taint tracking in the JVM.
1. Introduction
Dynamic taint analysis (also referred to as dynamic informa-
tion flow tracking) is a powerful form of information flow
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analysis useful for identifying the origin of data during ex-
ecution. Inputs to an application are “tainted,” or labeled
with a tag. As computations are performed, these labels are
propagated through the system such that any new values de-
rived from a tagged value also carry a tag derived from these
source input tags. In this way, we can inspect any object and
determine if it is derived from a tainted input by inspecting
its label. By maintaining a precise mapping from objects to
labels, we can enable a broad range of analyses, for such
purposes as end-user privacy testing [12], fine-grained data
security [1, 6, 22, 26], detection of code-injection attacks
[17, 28, 30] and improved debugging [14, 20].
Taint tracking systems typically face challenges in both
precision and accuracy, in that it is generally difficult to
determine the bounds of a variable in memory. Therefore,
some parts of a variable may become dissociated with their
intended taint tag, or multiple variables may inadvertently
be tracked together as a single variable. Taint tracking sys-
tems similarly face a challenge of performance: many ap-
plications for taint tracking rely on its use in real, deployed
systems, demanding an acceptably low run time overhead.
Traditional approaches to building taint tracking sys-
tems that address these challenges normally rely on mod-
ifications to the operating system [34, 39], modifications to
the language interpreter [1, 5, 12, 15, 23, 24], or access to
source code [19, 37]. While taint tracking at the interpreter
or source code level can improve accuracy and precision
(by providing variable-level memory semantics), these ap-
proaches all introduce a new challenge: portability. Such
approaches can have limited applicability due to the need
for modifications to client systems, need for specialized in-
terpreters, or need to access source code. For example, in
the case of several taint tracking systems that target the JVM
[5, 23], they are restricted to support only several specific
research-oriented JVMs which do not support the full Java
specification. For example, these systems are unable to exe-
cute the entirety of the popular macro-benchmark suite Da-
Capo [3], an indicator that they may be impractical to deploy
in client environments. We are not aware of any taint track-
ing systems that target the JVM that are sufficiently portable
to function with commonly used JVMs from vendors such
as Oracle and the OpenJDK project.
Our key insight is that we can leverage the same benefits
that interpreter-level and source code-level approaches gain
without requiring any modification to the underlying inter-
preter by taking advantage of the strong specification for the
intermediate language (i.e. byte code) that runs in that inter-
preter. This approach is a hybrid between interpreter level
approaches (which do not require access to source code but
require modifications to the interpreter) and source level ap-
proaches (which require access to source code but do not
change the interpreter), functioning instead at the level of
byte code. PHOSPHOR provides taint tracking within the
Java Virtual Machine (JVM) without requiring any modifi-
cations to the language interpreter, VM, or operating system,
and without requiring any access to source code. Moreover,
PHOSPHOR can be applied to any JVM, and functions with
code written in any language targeting the JVM, such as Java
and Scala.
We evaluated PHOSPHOR on a variety of macro and mi-
cro benchmarks on several widely-used JVMs from Oracle
and the OpenJDK project, finding its overhead to be impres-
sively low: as low as 3.32%, on average 53.31% in macro
benchmarks. We also compared PHOSPHOR to the popular,
state of the art Android-only taint tracking system, Taint-
Droid [12], finding that our approach is far more portable, is
more precise, and is comparable in performance.
The contributions of this paper are:
• A general purpose approach to efficiently storing meta-
data for variables in the JVM, without requiring any
modifications to the JVM.
• A general purpose approach to propagating this shadow
information in the form of taint tracking, again, without
requiring any modifications to the JVM.
• A description of our open source implementation of this
technique: PHOSPHOR (released on GitHub [2]).
2. Motivation
Next, we will briefly describe work in three broad areas that
relies on taint tracking and could benefit from PHOSPHOR.
Note that although several existing systems target Java
applications (e.g. [8, 16, 17]) by modifying application or li-
brary byte code, these are not general purpose: they can only
track data flow of Java Strings (and not of any other type),
and therefore are unable to continue tracking those Strings
in the event that they are converted by the application to an-
other representation (such as a character array). Moreover,
these systems can not track inputs that are not Strings (e.g.
integers, or a language-specific version of String in another,
non-Java JVM language). Also note that several existing sys-
tems can perform taint tracking on all data types in Java,
but are highly restricted in portability, functioning only on
research JVMs. The JVM targeted by [23] only supports a
subset of Java version 5 [32], while the JVM targeted by [5]
supports a subset of Java version 6, severely limiting appli-
cability [31]. We will refer to both of these research-oriented
JVMs as “incomplete JVMs,” as they do not implement the
complete Java specification, and are not generally used out-
side of the research community.
There is a need for a general purpose taint tracking sys-
tem that is sufficiently decoupled from the JVM to provide
ongoing support for the following sorts of analyses:
2.1 Detecting injection attacks
Taint tracking has been widely studied as a mechanism for
improving application security. Taint tracking can be used
to ensure that untrusted inputs from external sources (such
as an end-user) are not used as inputs to critical functions
[17, 28, 30]. For instance, consider an application that takes
an input string from the user, and then reads a file based
on that input, returning the file to the user. An attacker
could perhaps craft an input to coerce the application to
read and return an arbitrary file, including sensitive files such
as /etc/passwd. Similar injection attacks can occur when
calling external processes, or performing SQL queries. SQL
injection attacks are the fifth most prevalent type of attack
reported by CVE [10].
Taint tracking has been shown to be effective in detecting
these sorts of attacks: all user input is tagged with a taint, and
any function that may be an injection point is instrumented
to first check its arguments to ensure that there are no taint
tags. Trusted input sanitizers that sit between the user’s input
and the injection point can be used to allow sanitized inputs
to flow to possible injection points (with the assumption that
they will correctly sanitize the input).
2.2 Privacy testing and fine grained-access control
Taint tracking has also been successfully applied to fine-
grained information access control [1, 6, 22, 26], and to
end-user privacy testing [12]. In both cases, taint tracking
is used to improve the granularity of existing mechanisms
for enforcing rules about information flow. For access con-
trol, taint tracking is useful as it allows developers or sys-
tem administrators to specify access rules based on data.
For instance, administrators may wish to restrict the oper-
ations that users may perform on certain data, without a pri-
ori knowledge of where in the application’s control flow that
data may appear. As another example, an application may in-
clude untrusted libraries during run time, and want to restrict
those libraries from accessing sensitive data.
For end-user privacy testing, users specify system-wide
taint sources (e.g. on a mobile device, GPS location, per-
sonal contacts, etc.), and destinations, where tainted data
must never flow to (e.g. functions that send data over the
network). In this way, users can determine if their private
information is being transferred to remote servers.
Note that both of these applications of taint tracking de-
mand a system that is both performant and portable. For
example, an end-user may wish to observe the privacy vi-
olations of an application, without the prior planning of the
application developers to support taint-tracking. Moreover,
both systems would be challenging to implement in the JVM
without a taint tracking system.
2.3 Testing and Debugging
Taint tracking has also been employed to improve the testing
and debugging process. For instance, taint tracking can be
used to increase test coverage when using automated input
generators[20]. In this application, the taint tracking system
labels each input, and at each conditional branch, records
what label (or set of labels) the jump condition had. This
information is then fed back to the input generator to focus
input generation on those that are known to be restricting
control flow. This approach can also be useful for debugging
program failure by using taint tracking to identify which
inputs were relevant to the crash [14].
3. Approach
In designing PHOSPHOR, our primary goal was to enable
studies and analyses of dynamic data flow in languages that
target the JVM, such as Java, Scala and Clojure. Although
some of theses analyses may be targeted towards researchers
running experiments in closed environments (in which case,
run time overhead and portability are unlikely to be signif-
icant concerns), others may target actual use by end-users
(e.g. the privacy study performed in [12]). Hence, a key goal
for PHOSPHOR was to ensure that it has both relatively low
run time overhead and was portable (i.e. could be used on a
variety of JVMs and platforms). As described in the previ-
ous section, these sorts of analyses could be related to areas
such as security, debugging, and testing.
In general, common challenges to building taint tracking
systems in support of such analyses include:
1. Accuracy: When working with native binaries, it can be
difficult or impossible to determine the correct level of
granularity to assign distinct taint tags. Should each byte
be distinctly tagged? Each word? These questions are
difficult if not impossible to answer in the general case.
2. Precision: In the process of improving accuracy of a taint
tracking system, systems often trade higher accuracy for
lower precision, leading to over tainting, where taint tags
are propagated between values even when there is no
actual connection between them. In some cases, over
tainting can lead to significant decreases in precision,
with values marked by the wrong tag.
3. Portability: Most taint tracking systems require access to
application source code [19, 37], require modified oper-
ating systems [34, 39] or modified language interpreters
[1, 5, 15, 23, 24]. For example, [5] and [23] provide taint
tracking for the JVM, but require the use of specialized
and incomplete JVMs.
4. Performance: Taint tracking can add a very high perfor-
mance overhead (commonly showing slowdowns of 1x-
30x), limiting its use in deployment environments.
Our approach to taint tracking uses variable-level track-
ing, inspired by previous work that modified the interpreter
to support taint-tracking in Java [5, 12, 23]. A key obser-
vation is that when operating within the JVM (e.g. in Java,
Scala and others), we can bypass the common challenges
related to accuracy and precision: variables are clear units
of data, and because code can not access arbitrary memory
addresses, we can be certain that if we associate a taint tag
with a variable, any access to that variable can be mapped
to the taint tag. Therefore, this design choice can elimi-
nate some difficulties associated with maintaining precision
in taint tracking that typically affect systems operating at a
higher level (e.g. at the OS level [34, 39], or via binary in-
strumentation [7, 9]).
Most taint tracking systems for other memory man-
aged languages (e.g. targeting JavaScript [15], php [28, 38],
Dalvik [12], Java [5, 23] and others), rely on modifications
or extensions to the interpreter, which allows taint tracking
code access to significantly lower level memory operations
than taint tracking code running within a managed envi-
ronment like the JVM. However, in order to ensure porta-
bility, we designed PHOSPHOR to run entirely within the
confines of an unmodified JVM. The decision to run within
the confines of code executing in the JVM (and not inside
of the JVM’s interpreter) raises several unique challenges
because our taint tracking instrumentation is subject to the
same memory management restrictions that any other code
is. The prime challenge in creating PHOSPHOR, therefore, is
to efficiently maintain a mapping from values to taint tags
within the confines of a memory-managed environment.
3.1 JVM Background
Before describing how PHOSPHOR works, we first provide
a brief background on data organization within the JVM
(based on the JVM specification, version 7 [21]).
There are eight “primitive” types supported by the JVM,
all of which are stored and passed by value: boolean, byte,
character, integer, short, long, float, and double. In addition
to primitive types, the JVM supports two reference types:
objects and arrays. Objects are instances of classes, which
may contain fields (which are members of each instance)
and static fields (which are members of each class). Arrays
can be declared to store either reference types (which would
include other arrays) or primitive types. Reference types can
be cast to a super type, which effects what operations are
available on that instance of that type, and are all sub-types
of the root type, java/lang/Object.
The JVM is a stack machine, with stack memory split into
two components: the operand stack and the local variable
area. The operand stack is used for passing operands to in-
structions and can only be manipulated with stack operators,
while the local variable area is indexed. Method arguments
are passed by placing them on the operand stack, and are ac-
cessed by the receiver as local variables. The combination








Figure 1: The high level architecture of PHOSPHOR
frame. When a method is invoked, a new frame is created
for that method, and when it returns, the frame is destroyed;
code can not access any frame other than the current frame.
3.2 High Level Design
Figure 1 shows a high level overview of our approach to
portable taint tracking with PHOSPHOR: we modify all byte
code running within the JVM, and then run that code in
a completely unmodified JVM, running on an unmodified
operating system, with commodity hardware.
PHOSPHOR’s taint tracking is based on variable-level
tracking, storing a tag for every variable. When operations
are performed on these variables, PHOSPHOR combines their
taint tags to create the new tag for the resulting combination.
PHOSPHOR modifies byte code to include storage for
taint tags and to include instructions to propagate these tags.
We use the ASM [4] byte code manipulation library to insert
our instrumentation and support all recent versions of the
Java byte code specification (up to version 8). This instru-
mentation normally occurs offline (before execution) but in
the event that a class is defined at run time (and hence, wasn’t
instrumented), PHOSPHOR intercepts all classes as they are
loaded, ensuring that every single class is instrumented. The
instrumentation process is performed only once per class and
is relatively quick, requiring only 1.4 minutes to instrument
the entire Java 7 JRE. Figure 2 shows an example of the
sorts of transformations that are applied to byte code. Note
that our example is shown as Java source code for ease of
understanding, but in reality, all transformations occur at the
level of Java byte code.
At the high level, PHOSPHOR adds a field to every Class
to track the tag of instances of that Class, and adds a shadow
variable for every variable that is not an instance of a Class
to track that variable’s tag. When it’s impossible to add such
a variable (e.g. to pass the tag of a primitive return value
from a method), PHOSPHOR combines the taint tag with
the value into a container class, which encapsulates both
the tag and the value into one reference (which is then the
return value). Formally, PHOSPHOR consults the following
five properties to determine how to store or retrieve the taint
tag for a variable:
Property 3.1. Let R be a reference to an instance of an
Object. Then the taint tag of R is stored as a component of
the object to which R points.
Property 3.2. Let A be a reference to an array of references.
Then the taint tag of array element A[i] is stored as a com-
ponent of the object to which A[i] points.
Property 3.3. Let V be a primitive value. Then the taint tag
of V is stored as a shadow value next to V .
Property 3.4. Let A be a primitive array reference. Then
a shadow array As is stored next to A, and the taint tag of
primitive value A[i] is As[i].
Property 3.5. Let A be a primitive array reference and As
be the reference to its shadow array. If A is stored as the
type Object, then A and As are first boxed into a container,
as C(A,As).
Note that by these properties, every single variable has its
own distinct taint tag: each element in an array is tracked
distinctly (unlike in other taint tracking systems, such as
[5, 12], which sacrifice this precision for added performance
by storing only a single taint tag for all of the elements in
an array). The implementation and rationale behind each of
these properties is described in much greater detail in §4.1.
PHOSPHOR can automatically apply a taint tag to vari-
ables that are returned from pre-defined taint “source” meth-
ods (for instance, methods that take user input). When ap-
plying taint-tracking transformations to byte code, PHOS-
PHOR consults a configuration file for a list of methods
that should result in their return value (or arguments) be-
ing tainted. PHOSPHOR also consults the same configuration
file for a list of methods that should check their arguments
to determine if any of them are tainted (a “taint sink.” for
instance, a method that executes a SQL command), logging
the occurrence or raising an exception in the case that they
are tainted.
For more complicated semantics to mark variables with
taint tags and respond to variables that are marked, PHOS-
PHOR provides a simple API, exposing the simple functions
setTaint and getTaint, which respectively set the taint
tag of an element and retrieve the taint tag of an element.
These functions are useful for implementers of analyses that
build upon PHOSPHOR, and are not intended to need to be
inserted into any target application code directly.
PHOSPHOR represents the taint of a variable as a 32-bit
long bit vector, allowing for a total of 32 distinct taints (sim-
ilar to other systems, such as TaintDroid [12]. When taint
tags are combined, they are bit-wise OR’ed. Alternatively,
a developer could provide more complex logic for generat-
ing and combining taint tags, allowing for 232 possible taint
tags, although with perhaps greater overhead (an evaluation
which we leave for future work and consider out of scope).
3.3 Approach Limitations
There are several limitations to our approach. First: PHOS-
PHOR is a system for tracking dynamic data flow through
taint analysis, and does not track taint tags through control
flow. That is, tags are combined through “explicit” opera-
1 p u b l i c c l a s s Example{ / / O r i g i n a l Code
2
3 s t a t i c i n t v a l ;
4 b y t e [ ] bArray ;
5 S t r i n g s t r ;
6
7
8 Example ( i n t n ) {
9 bArray = new b y t e [ n ] ;
10
11 }
12 i n t doMath ( i n t i n ) {
13 i n t r e t = i n + v a l ;
14
15 r e t u r n r e t ;
16 }
17 }
(a) The original class
1 p u b l i c c l a s s Example { / / With T a i n t i n g
2 i n t phosphorTag ;
3 s t a t i c i n t v a l ;
4 s t a t i c i n t v a l t a g ;
5 b y t e [ ] bArray ;
6 i n t [ ] b A r r a y t a g ;
7 S t r i n g s t r ;
8 Example ( i n t n t a g , i n t n ) {
9 bArray = new b y t e [ n ] ;
10 b A r r a y t a g = new i n t [ n ] ;
11 }
12 T a i n t e d I n t doMath ( i n t i n t a g , i n t i n ) {
13 i n t r e t = i n + v a l ;
14 i n t r e t t a g = i n t a g | v a l t a g ;
15 r e t u r n T a i n t e d I n t . va lueOf ( r e t t a g , r e t ) ;
16 }
17 }
(b) The modified class, ready to track taint tags
Figure 2: A basic example of the sort of transformations that PHOSPHOR applies at the byte code level to support taint tracking.
Underlined lines call out to changes made by PHOSPHOR. Example shown at the source level, for easier reading.
tions (i.e. data flow), and not through “implicit” operations
(i.e control flow). However, existing approaches towards im-
plementing control flow tracking (e.g. [5, 9, 23]) could be
combined with our approach for data flow tracking, which
we consider outside of the scope of this paper. Next, as
PHOSPHOR functions within the confines of the JVM, it is
unable to track data flow through native code executing out-
side of but interacting with the JVM. We have implemented
the current best-practices for handling such flows, discussed
further in §4.3. Finally, since our approach requires modi-
fying the byte code of applications, this could modify the
behavior of applications that somehow use that byte code
as an input, since the byte code will have been modified by
PHOSPHOR to include taint propagation instructions. Typi-
cally in Java, such inspection is done using the Reflection in-
terface, which our implementation patches to hide all traces
of PHOSPHOR.
4. Implementation
4.1 Taint Tag Storage
Based on the discussion above of memory organization
within the JVM, we consider shadow variable storage (for
taint tags) in four different areas: as fields, as local vari-
ables, on the operand stack, and as method return values.
Moreover, based on the discussion of types in the JVM, we
consider five broad categories of variables for which we may
need different taint tag representations: primitives, primitive
arrays, multi-dimensional primitive arrays, arrays of other
references, and general references. For each of these types,
we will enumerate rules for their taint tag storage.
4.1.1 Reference Types
PHOSPHOR stores one taint tag per-variable, so there is no
tag stored for each reference to a variable: the taint tag of a
reference is really just the tag of the value that it points to.
Storing the taint tag for references that point to instances of
classes (i.e. Objects) is straightforward: PHOSPHOR adds a
new field to that type, such that each instance of the class has
an extra field in which we can store the taint tag. This model
extends to support arrays of reference types, since the taint
tag of each reference type in the array is stored directly as
part of the reference type. From these two observations, we
can derive Properties 3.1 and 3.2.
Multi-dimensional primitive arrays must also be treated
by these same rules, as they are arrays of reference types
(recall that a primitive array is a reference type, so a multi-
dimensional primitive array must be an array of references).
In order to support taint tracking on multi-dimensional
primitive arrays, PHOSPHOR always boxes multi-dimension
primitive arrays into containers that store both the array and
the tag. All references to multi-dimension character arrays
are remapped to access the array through the container, en-
suring that Property 3.2 continues to hold.
4.1.2 Primitives and Primitive Arrays
For variables that are primitives (or primitive arrays), we
cannot simply add an extra field to the type to store the
tag, since there is no structure exposed within the JVM
that represents these types that we could modify. Instead,
PHOSPHOR stores the taint tag (or a reference to the taint
tag) in a shadow, alongside the actual value (Properties 3.3
and 3.4). This subsection will describe exactly where that
shadow is stored.
For variables that are stored as fields in a class, PHOS-
PHOR creates a shadow field to store the taint tag for that
element. For instance, if a class has a member private
int val, then PHOSPHOR adds another field: private
int var tag.
To support primitive values and primitive arrays as local
variables, PHOSPHOR creates an additional local variable to
store the taint tag, for each local variable that represents a
primitive or primitive array. Primitive and primitive array
method arguments are supported similarly to local variables:
we create shadow arguments to track the taint tag for each
primitive and primitive array argument.
Primitive and primitive array return types are supported
by boxing the value and its taint tag into a container just be-
fore return. PHOSPHOR changes the return type of all such
methods to be the appropriate container, and modifies the re-
turn instruction to first construct the container, and then re-
turn it (instead of just returning the primitive value or primi-
tive array reference). Just after the call site to a method that
returns a container type, the container is unboxed, leaving
the primitive return value on the stack, with the taint tag
just below it. To reduce overhead, each method pre-allocates
containers at its entry point for the methods that it will call,
passing these containers to each method called. In this way,
if a method makes several calls to another method which re-
turns a primitive value, only one container is allocated, and
is re-used for each call.
To support primitive values and primitive arrays on the
operand stack, PHOSPHOR instruments every stack operator
to ensure that before any primitive value or primitive array
reference is pushed onto the stack its taint tag is pushed
as well, and just after a primitive value or primitive array
reference is popped, its taint tag is as well.
PHOSPHOR creates these extra fields and variables as nec-
essary based on the type information for the field or variable.
However, note that because primitive arrays are reference
types, they are assignable to fields and variables with the
generic type Object (for which PHOSPHOR would not have
a priori created a shadow variable). PHOSPHOR accounts for
this situation by automatically boxing primitive arrays with
their taint tags before assigning them to the generic type Ob-
ject, and by automatically unboxing them when casting from
the generic type Object back to a primitive array.
4.2 Propagating Taint Tags
The remainder of this section will describe the specific
changes made to application and library byte code to propa-
gate taint tags. A complete listing of all byte codes available
and the modifications that PHOSPHOR makes is available in
the appendix to this paper, in Table 3.
Method and Field Declarations: PHOSPHOR rewrites
all method declarations to include taint tags for each primi-
tive or primitive array, and to change all primitive and prim-
itive array return types to be container types, which include
the taint tag on the primitive value in addition to the actual
value. All references to multi-dimension primitive arrays (in
both fields and method descriptors) are replaced with con-
tainer types. PHOSPHOR adds a new instance field to every
class, used to track the taint tag of that instance. Finally,
for every field that is a primitive or primitive array, PHOS-
PHOR adds an additional field that stores the taint of that
primitive or primitive array.
Array Instructions: For all array load or store instruc-
tions, PHOSPHOR must remove the taint tag of the array
index from the operand stack before the instruction is exe-
cuted. For stores to primitive arrays, PHOSPHOR inserts in-
structions to also store the the taint tag of the value being
stored into the taint array. For loads from primitive arrays,
PHOSPHOR similarly inserts instructions to load the taint tag
from the taint array. For stores to reference type arrays, if
the item being stored is a primitive array, PHOSPHOR inserts
instructions to box the array and tag into a container before
storing it.
PHOSPHOR instruments instructions that create new one-
dimension primitive arrays with additional instructions to
also create a taint tag array with the same length. For instruc-
tions that create multi-dimension primitive arrays, PHOS-
PHOR modifies them to instead create arrays of our contain-
ers (as discussed in §4.1.1).
The last array instruction that PHOSPHOR instruments
is ARRAYLENGTH, which pops an array off of the operand
stack and pushes onto the stack the length of that array.
For this instruction, PHOSPHOR adds instructions to pop the
taint array from the stack (if the array is a primitive array),
and to add an empty taint (i.e. 0) to the returned value (we
consider array length to be a control flow operation, and do
not propagate any array taints into the taint of the length).
Local Variable Instructions: PHOSPHOR adds an in-
struction to store a variable’s taint tag immediately after each
instruction that stores a primitive or primitive array variable.
Similarly, for instructions that store object references to lo-
cal variables, if the variable type is a primitive array, PHOS-
PHOR also stores the taint tag array for that variable. If the
variable type is not a primitive array (i.e. Object), but the
item being stored is a primitive array, then PHOSPHOR in-
serts instructions to first box the array into a container, be-
fore storing the array. For instructions that load local vari-
ables onto the operand stack, if the variable is a primitive
or primitive array, then just before the variable is loaded,
PHOSPHOR loads the pre-existing shadow variable (contain-
ing the taint tag) onto the array.
Method Calls: PHOSPHOR instruments every method
call, first modifying the method descriptor (i.e. the argu-
ments and return type) to pass taint tags. Next, PHOS-
PHOR ensures that for every parameter of the generic type
Object, if the parameter being passed is a primitive array, its
taint array is boxed with it into a container. If the method
is an instance method (i.e. has a receiver instance), PHOS-
PHOR ensures that if the receiver is a primitive array, its taint
tag is dropped from the operand stack before the call. Im-
mediately after the method call, if its return type had been
changed to a container type, instructions are inserted to “un-
box” the container, placing on the top of the stack the return
value followed by the taint tag.
Method Returns: PHOSPHOR ensures that all return in-
structions that would otherwise return a primitive value or
reference to a primitive array first box the primitive or prim-
itive array with its taint tag(s) before returning.
Arithmetic Instructions: For arithmetic operators that
take two operands (e.g. addition, subtraction, multiplication,
etc), each operator expects that the top two values on the
stack are the operands, yet with PHOSPHOR, the top value
will be the first operand, while the second will be the taint
tag of the first operand, and the third the second operand,
with the fourth its taint tag (as shown in Figure 3). PHOS-
PHOR prepends each arithmetic operator with instructions to
combine the two taint tags (by bitwise ORing them), placing
the new taint tag under the two (intended) operands, allow-
ing the arithmetic to complete successfully.
Type Instructions: The JVM provides the instanceof
instruction, which pops an object reference off of the stack
and returns an integer indicating if that reference is an
instance of a specified type. For this instruction, PHOS-
PHOR inserts a null taint tag (i.e. “‘0”) under the return value
of the instruction (similar to array length, we consider this
to be a control flow operation). Additionally, if the refer-
ence type on the operand stack is a primitive array, then its
taint tag array is dropped fem the stack. If the type argu-
ment to instanceof is a multidimensional primitive array,
then PHOSPHOR changes the argument to instead refer to
the appropriate container type.
The other type instruction that PHOSPHOR instruments
is the checkcast instruction, which ensures that the object
reference at the top of the stack is an instance of a specified
type, throwing an exception if not. PHOSPHOR rewrites this
instruction to be aware of our boxed container types: if
the cast is to a one-dimension primitive array type and the
operand is a container, PHOSPHOR first unboxes the array
and its taint tag array. If the cast is to a multi-dimension
primitive array, then PHOSPHOR changes the type cast to be
to the appropriate container type, leaving it boxed.
Stack Manipulators: There are several instructions that
directly manipulate the order of elements on the operand
stack, for instance, swapping the top two values. In all cases,
PHOSPHOR modifies each instruction based on the contents
of the operand stack just before execution. For instance, if
instruction will swap the top two elements on the stack, and
the top element is a primitive value (with a taint tag stored
beneath it), but the element below that is an object reference
(and hence, with no taint tag stored beneath it on the stack),
then PHOSPHOR removes the swap instruction, and replaces
it with instructions to place the top two elements beneath the
third.
Locking Instructions: There are two instructions in Java
byte code related to locking, one to procure a lock on an
object reference, and one to release a lock already held on
an object reference. In both cases, PHOSPHOR checks the
top stack value, and if it is a one dimensional primitive array
(which implies that there is a taint tag array on the stack
beneath it), PHOSPHOR pops the taint tag array after the lock
is acquired or released.
Jump Instructions: The JVM provides several jump in-
structions, jumping on either one or two object references or
primitive values. For those that jump based on primitive val-
ues, in all cases PHOSPHOR first removes the taint tag from
the value(s) being checked before the jump. For those that
jump based on object references, PHOSPHOR removes the
taint array tag, if the value(s) being checked before the jump
are references to one dimensional primitive arrays.
4.3 Native Code and Reflection
As PHOSPHOR is implemented within the JVM, it is re-
stricted from propagating taint tags in code that executes
outside of the JVM. The JVM allows for “native” methods,
which are implemented in native machine code, and can be
called by normal code running inside of the JVM. We follow
the same approach used by TaintDroid [12] for patching taint
flow through these methods: for the native methods that are
used internally by Java, we patch those necessary for taint
propagation. These methods include those used to imple-
ment reflection and for performing direct memory copying
of arrays. Around each native method call, we insert a wrap-
per that can propagate taint tags from the arguments of the
method into the return value. As with TaintDroid, our imple-
mentation currently assigns the taint tag of the return type to
be the union of the taint tags of all primitive and String pa-
rameters. The wrapper is also necessary to wrap and unwrap
values from their container types. For example, if a native
method returns a primitive integer, the calling code will ex-
pect that the return value will actually be a BoxedTaintedIn-
teger (rather than the primitive integer that it would normally
return).
Java supports reflection, a feature that allows code to dy-
namically access and invoke classes and methods. PHOS-
PHOR patches all reflective calls to include taint tags as nec-











Figure 3: Operand stack before and after performing two-
operand arithmetic. The actual operands are shown as O, and
their taint tags as T .
1 p u b l i c s t a t i c I n t e g e r va lueOf ( i n t i ) {
2 a s s e r t I n t e g e r C a c h e . h igh >= 127 ;
3 i f ( i >= I n t e g e r C a c h e . low && i <=
I n t e g e r C a c h e . h igh )
4 r e t u r n I n t e g e r C a c h e . cache [ i + (−
I n t e g e r C a c h e . low ) ] ;
5 r e t u r n new I n t e g e r ( i ) ;
6 }
Figure 4: Java’s Integer.valueOf method, a very commonly
used method with an implicit flow caused by caching. If the
input is between IntegerCache.low and IntegerCache.high,
the output will have no taint tag, even if the input did.
and methods that exist in classes to hide any artifacts of the
taint tracking process, removing additional fields and argu-
ments as applicable.
4.4 Java-Specific Features
While our taint tracking process is generic to any language
running in the JVM, we found that its support of Java could
be significantly enhanced with several optimizations and
modifications. For instance, both JVMs that we evaluated
(OpenJDK and Oracle’s HotSpot JVM) make implicit as-
sumptions about the internal structure of several classes (no-
tably the super-type: java.lang.Object, and several of the
classes internally used as containers for primitive types:
java.lang.Character, java.lang.Byte, java.lang.Boolean, and
java.lang.Short), which would prevent PHOSPHOR from
adding taint storage fields to these classes. PHOSPHOR does
not track taint tags on raw instances of the class java.lang.
Object, which has no fields itself, and therefore, we do not
believe is relevant in data flow analyses. For the four re-
stricted primitive container types, PHOSPHOR instead stores
the taint tag for instances of these types in a HashMap (sim-
ilar to the technique used by [35]), hence avoiding the need
to modify the internal structure of the class.
We also make a small modification to support a very com-
monly used implicit flow in Java. Primitive container types
can be very frequently used in Java, and are used within the
JVM when necessary to represent a primitive value as an in-
stance of a reference type. For efficiency, for each primitive
type there is a cache of instances of the container class for all
low values of that type. Listing 4 reproduces the code used
to fetch an instance of Class Integer. Due to the implicit flow
in lines 3-4, if an integer is found in the cache, then its taint
tag is dropped. If the integer does not exist in the cache, then
the taint tag will be propagated into the new instance of In-
teger in line 5. PHOSPHOR modifies the code that calls the
valueOf method for each of the primitive container types
to ensure that if the primitive argument has a non-zero taint
tag, a new instance of the container is created with the tag,
hence continuing to propagate taint tags.
4.5 Optimizations
The entire instrumentation process is implemented in a
stream-processing manner: for each byte code instruction,
PHOSPHOR outputs new instructions, without context of in-
structions that previously were output, or those that will be
output next. We add several short optimization passes to pro-
vide a small amount of context to PHOSPHOR’s instrumenta-
tion process, greatly reducing the size of outputted methods.
First, PHOSPHOR detects instances where taint tags may be
loaded to the stack, then immediately popped: for instance,
variables loaded to the operand stack and used as operands
for jump conditions. PHOSPHOR simply ignores loading the
taint tags in these places.
Next, PHOSPHOR detects large methods that perform no
instructions other than to load constants into arrays. Rather
than initialize the taint tag for each constant as each constant
is loaded, PHOSPHOR instead reasons that all tags will be 0,
and can instead rapidly initialize them all at once, rather than
initializing them one-by-one. This optimization was neces-
sary in several cases in order to ensure that the generated
methods remained within the maximum method size.
Finally, after all instrumentation has been completed,
PHOSPHOR scans each generated method for simplifica-
tions. For example, given our rules outlined in the previous
section, for any method that returns a primitive value, in-
structions are inserted after its call site to unbox the taint
tag and return value from the return container. However, if
both of those values will be immediately discarded from the
stack (i.e. pop’ed), then we can simplify the instructions that
load and then discard the return value and return taint tag to
simply not load the value or tag.
To some extent, these optimizations can also be achieved
by the JIT compiler as it compiles the byte code, but we
have found that performing them in advance still improves
run time (and in some cases, is necessary to ensure that the
generated code fits within the maximum method size).
4.6 Application to Android and Dalvik
Although we designed PHOSPHOR for the JVM, we recog-
nized that it could also be applicable to the language vir-
tual machine used by Android, the Dalvik Virtual Machine
(DVM). Nearly all applications for Android devices are writ-
ten in Java, which is then compiled to Java byte code, and
then translated into the DVM’s form of byte code, called dex.
Because it executes a translated form of Java byte code,
and PHOSPHOR operates at the byte code level, we can
apply PHOSPHOR to Android and the DVM by inserting
taint propagation logic in the intermediate Java byte code
before it is translated to dex. PHOSPHOR could even be
applied without needing this intermediate Java byte code,
by using a tool such as [11], which translates dex byte
code back into Java byte code. Note that although it runs
a translated form of Java byte code, the DVM should not be
confused with a JVM; our primary target remains the JVM,
and any modifications to the DVM or access to intermediate
compiled code described in this subsection are unnecessary
for JVM taint tracking.
There are many optimizations that the DVM performs be-
yond those of the JVM, perhaps due to the tight vertical inte-
gration of Android devices (from operating system to inter-
preter to language to APIs and applications). Several of these
optimizations pose significant challenges for PHOSPHOR, as
they significantly increase coupling between the interpreter
and other classes, beyond those discussed in §4.4. Notably,
the DVM provides very efficient native implementations of
the java.lang.String methods charAt, compareTo, equals,
fastIndexOf, isEmpty and length. These implementa-
tions rely on compile-time knowledge of the run-time or-
ganization of the class java.lang.String (i.e. the byte-level
offsets of each field). Further, the DVM assumes in several
cases that all internal primitive container types (not just the
several assumed by the JVMs evaluated) contain only a sin-
gle field containing the primitive value, and no other fields.
While we could in principle support taint tracking instances
of these classes by storing their taint tag in a HashMap (as
for the several classes similarly restricted in the JVMs eval-
uated), doing so for all of the tightly coupled classes would
have posed a prohibitive overhead.
Instead, we made several very small modifications to the
Dalvik VM to decouple the VM from the implementation
of these classes. Note that although we chose to modify the
DVM in this case, the number of changes is significantly
smaller than those necessary for TaintDroid, as we are not
modifying the interpreter to perform taint tracking, but only
to decouple it. These changes required modifying seven con-
stants defined in header files, and modifying six lines of na-
tive code that handle reflection. In comparison, the most re-
cent version of TaintDroid (4.3.1) contains a total of over
32,000 lines of new code in the Dalivk VM (as reported by
executing a diff of the repository), of which over 18,000 are
in assembly code files, and 10,661 in C source code files.
5. Related Work
Dynamic taint analysis is a problem widely studied, with
many different systems tailored to specific purposes and lan-
guages. For instance, there are several system-wide tainting
approaches based on modifications to the operating system
([30] and others). However, PHOSPHOR tracks taint tags by
instrumenting application byte code. This general approach
is most similar to other approaches that track taint tags by
instrumenting application binaries.
DyTan is a general purpose taint tracking system target-
ing x86 binaries that supports implicit flow tainting, in addi-
tion to normal data flow tainting, with runtime slowdown
ranging from 30x-50x [9]. TaintTrace only performs data
flow tainting (like PHOSPHOR), and achieves an average
slowdown of 5.53x [7]. Libdft, another binary taint track-
ing tool, shows overheads between 1.14x-6x, thanks to op-
timizations largely based on assumptions that inputs will be
infrequently tainted [18]. In contrast, PHOSPHOR does not
apply such optimizations, and therefore its performance will
remain constant regardless of the frequency of tainting.
Another general class of taint tracking systems target in-
terpreted languages, making modifications to the language
interpreter, targeting, for example, JavaScript [36], Python
[38], PHP [24, 28, 38], Dalvik [12] and the JVM [5, 23]. In
general, interpreter level approaches can benefit from addi-
tional information provided by the language that defines the
precise boundary of each object in memory (so accuracy and
precision can be improved over binary-level approaches).
The portability of these systems is often restricted, as they
require modifications to the language interpreter and/or man-
ual modifications to application source code.
Of these interpreter-based taint tracking systems, the
most relevant to PHOSPHOR are Trishul [5], an approach
by Nair et al. [23], and TaintDroid [12]. Trishul performs
data and control flow taint tracking by modifying the Kaffe
interpreted JVM, an open source JVM implementation (in
a purely interpreted mode, with no JIT compilation —
adding an inherent slowdown of several orders of magni-
tude). Chandra et al. modifies the Jikes Research Virtual
Machine to perform data and control flow taint tracking,
showing slowdowns of up to 2x on micro-benchmarks, but
its implementation depends on the usage of the research
VM, rather than a more popularly deployed JVM [5]. Nei-
ther the Jikes nor the Kaffe JVM support the complete Java
language specification. TaintDroid is a popular taint tracking
system for Android’s Dalvik Virtual Machine (DVM), im-
plemented by modifying the Dalvik interpreter [12]. Taint-
Droid only maintains a single taint tag for every element in
an array (unlike PHOSPHOR, which maintains a tag for each
element), allowing TaintDroid to perform more favorably on
array-based benchmarks, but at the cost of precision.
While all of these approaches employ variable-level
tracking (like PHOSPHOR), the key difference that sets
PHOSPHOR apart is its portability: for all three of the above
systems, each requires modifications to the language inter-
preter. For example, TaintDroid’s most recent version adds
over 32,000 lines of code to the VM (as measured by lines of
code in the TaintDroid patch to Android 4.3.1). For any new
release of the VM, the changes must be ported into the new
version and if a researcher or user wished to use a differ-
ent VM (or perhaps on a different architecture), they would
need to port the tracking code to that VM. PHOSPHOR, on
the other hand, is designed with portability in mind: PHOS-
PHOR runs within the JVM, without requiring any modifica-
tions to the interpreter (and we show its applicability to the
popular Oracle HotSpot and OpenJDK IcedTea JVMs). This
design choice also allows us to support Android’s Dalvik
Virtual Machine with only minor modifications, as discussed
in §4.6.
There have been several recent works in dynamic taint
tracking for Java that operate by modifying core Java li-
braries to track taint tags. Without requiring interpreter mod-
ification, WASP detects and prevents SQL injection attacks
in Java by using taint tracking with low overhead (1-19%),
but is restricted to only track taint tags on Strings [17], much
like the earlier Java tainting system by Haldar et al. [16],
and Chin et al’s optimized version of the same technique
[8]. PHOSPHOR differs from all of these approaches in that
it tracks taints on all data within the JVM: not just Strings.
Vitasek et al. propose a solution to a problem related to
taint tracking: in addition to assigning labels to each object
in the JVM, their ShadowData system can also enumerate all
such labels[35]. Vitasek et al. evaluated several approaches
to this, finding the most efficient to be storing the mapping
from object to label in a HashMap, showing slowdown rang-
ing from 4.8x-185.5x, largely due to contention in accessing
that HashMap, a drawback that PHOSPHOR’s decentralized
taint tag storage avoids.
While PHOSPHOR and the systems discussed thus far
provide dynamic taint tracking, static taint analysis is also a
topic of interest. However, while static taint analysis for Java
[13, 29, 33] can determine a priori where data might leak
from a system, it may report false positives from code which
can not execute in practice, and as with all static analysis
tools for Java, it must model reflective calls, possibly further
increasing the likelihood of false positives.
6. Evaluation
We evaluated PHOSPHOR in the dimensions of performance
(as measured by runtime overhead and memory overhead)
and in accuracy and precision. We have also compared the
performance of PHOSPHOR with that of TaintDroid, when
running within the Dalivk VM on an Android device. We
were restricted from comparing against other taint tracking
systems, as many were unavailable for download and did not
utilize standardized benchmarks in their evaluations. All of
our JVM experiments were performed on an Apple Mac-
book Pro (2013) running Mac OS 10.9.1 with a 2.6Ghz Intel
Core i7 processor and 16 GB of RAM. We used four JVMs:
Oracle’s “HotSpot” JVM, version 1.7.0 45 and 1.8.0 and the
OpenJDK “IcedTea” JVM, of the same two versions. For all
experiments, no other applications were running and the sys-
tem was otherwise at rest. All of our Android experiments
were performed on a Nexus 10, running Android version
4.3.1, built from the Android Open Source Project reposi-
tory. No other applications were running on the Android de-
vice during our experiments.
6.1 Performance: Macro benchmarks
Our first performance evaluation focused on macro bench-
marks, from the DaCapo [3] benchmark suite (9.12 “bach”),
and the Scalabench [27] benchmark suite (0.1.0-20120216).
The DaCapo benchmark suite contains 14 benchmarks that
exercise popular open source applications with workloads
designed to be representative of real-world usage. Several of
these workloads are highly relevant to taint tracking applica-
tions, as they benchmark web servers: the “tomcat,” “trade-
beans” and “tradesoap” workloads. The Scalabench suite
contains 12 benchmarks written in Scala that are also broad
in scope.
First, we ran the benchmarks using both the Oracle
“HotSpot” JVM and the OpenJDK “IcedTea” JVM in our
test environment to measure baseline execution time. Then,
we instrumented both JVMs and all of the benchmarks to
perform taint tracking, and measured the resulting execu-
tion time and the maximum heap usage reported by the
JVM. Each experiment was performed 10 times using the
“default” size workload, and the results were averaged. For
each execution of each benchmark, we allowed the bench-
mark execution time to converge before recording the result-
ing execution time (using the default, suggested convergence
settings).
We include results for all benchmarks except for the
“scalac” benchmark from the scalabench workloads, a bench-
mark that exercises the Scala compiler. The Scala compiler
has certain expectations about the structure and contents of
class files that it compiles, so injecting taint tracking code
into the compiler itself causes runtime errors. A general lim-
itation of our approach is that applications that read their
own byte code directly (i.e. rather than that code being read
and interpreted by the JVM) may not function correctly, as
we have modified that byte code (a limitation discussed pre-
viously in §3.3).
Table 1 presents the results of this study, showing detailed
results for Oracle’s HotSpot JVM (version 7), and summary
results for HotSpot 8, and OpenJDK’s IcedTea JVMs (ver-
sions 7 and 8). We focus on the results for HotSpot 7, as it is
far more widely adopted than version 8 (at time of submis-
sion, Java 7 was approximately three years old, and Java 8
was approximately one week old). Using Oracle’s HotSpot
JVM 7, for the DaCapo suite, the average runtime overhead
was 51.93%, and across the Scalabench suite, the average
runtime overhead was 55.08% (runtime overhead for other
JVMs is shown in Table 1). The average heap overhead was
239.08% for DaCapo, and 311.47% for Scalabench (heap
usage in the other JVMs was similar). This heap overhead
is unsurprising: in addition to requiring additional memory
to store the taint tags, PHOSPHOR also increases memory
usage by its need to allocate containers to box and unbox
primitives and primitive arrays for return values, and primi-
tive arrays when casting them to the generic type Object (as
discussed in §4.1.2).
We saw the best performance from PHOSPHOR in the
“avrora” benchmark, and worst performance in the eclipse
benchmark. The “avrora” benchmark runs a simulator of
an AVR micro controller, and from our inspection, contains
many primitive-value operations. We believe that it was a
Oracle Hotspot 7 Other JVMs
Runtime (ms) Heap Size (MB) Runtime Overhead
Category Benchmark Tb Tp Overhead Mb Mp Overhead HotSpot 8 IcedTea 7 IcedTea 8
DaCapo
9.12-bach [3]
avrora 2333 2410 3.32% 75 223 198.77% 0.66% 3.81% 3.59%
batik 903 1024 13.46% 105 211 100.22% 12.13% N/A* N/A*
eclipse 15305 48907 219.55% 1026 2901 182.65% 138.77% 209.84% 123.98%
fop 203 320 57.73% 100 261 162.02% 63.34% 57.42% 49.83%
h2 3718 5137 38.17% 739 2738 270.49% 33.96% 34.67% 35.20%
jython 1343 2107 56.89% 412 805 95.14% 25.67% 59.43% 26.83%
luindex 454 642 41.61% 39 157 303.59% 52.91% 44.44% 53.17%
lusearch 584 1126 92.75% 619 2750 344.19% 86.57% 102.02% 92.62%
pmd 1336 1705 27.63% 172 583 239.45% 26.82% 29.80% 23.52%
sunflow 1616 2182 35.00% 532 1086 104.33% 28.79% 28.21% 29.08%
tomcat 1364 1885 38.22% 173 881 410.65% 33.36% 29.97% 36.79%
tradebeans 3175 4189 31.91% 1093 2225 103.63% 33.25% 41.41% 34.26%
tradesoap 12159 14657 20.55% 1910 3058 60.05% 17.48% 14.08% 3.60%
xalan 498 748 50.21% 91 790 771.93% 49.21% 38.48% 75.65%





actors 2523 2663 5.54% 90 716 691.99% 4.00% .61% 3.47%
apparat 7874 13516 71.65% 509 2430 376.98% 102.63% 66.69% 92.75%
factorie 19262 25063 30.12% 2769 2791 0.77% 38.71% 32.12% 35.51%
kiama 238 381 60.27% 151 529 250.67% 51.10% 52.92% 59.71%
scaladoc 1092 2206 102.08% 174 1225 602.72% 98.04% 93.97% 93.99%
scalap 136 227 67.33% 86 298 248.81% 82.08% 61.64% 82.25%
scalariform 419 523 24.64% 88 304 246.13% 28.86% 21.76% 23.51%
scalatest 840 1133 34.85% 153 599 292.14% 45.43% 32.80% 41.86%
scalaxb 288 540 87.83% 87 413 373.58% 218.78% 79.91% 219.18%
specs 1268 1770 39.55% 162 714 340.80% 24.63% 36.46% 40.57%
tmt 3755 6834 81.97% 2733 2777 1.63% 94.97% 81.53% 93.45%
Average 3427 4987 55.08% 637 1163 311.47% 71.75% 50.95% 71.48%
All Average 3307 5676 53.31% 563 1259 270.93% 55.69% 52.25% 57.27%
Table 1: Runtime duration for macro benchmarks, showing baseline time (Tb), PHOSPHOR time (Tp) and relative overhead
for Oracle’s HotSpot JVM version 1.7.0 45. We also show heap size measurements for the baseline execution (Mb) and
PHOSPHOR execution (Mp), as well as the percent overhead for heap size. For HotSpot 8, IcedTea 7 and IcedTea 8, we
show only runtime overhead. *The “batik” benchmark depends on Oracle-proprietary classes, and therefore does not execute
on the OpenJDK IcedTea JVM.
prime target for optimization by the JIT compiler; indeed,
when disabling the JIT compiler and running the bench-
mark in a purely interpreted mode, we saw an 87% over-
head, much more in line with the average performance of
PHOSPHOR. “Eclipse” represents a greater mix of opera-
tions that are more complicated and computationally ex-
pensive for PHOSPHOR to implement. For instance, many
parts of the Eclipse JDT Java compiler (a component of the
benchmark) store primitive arrays into fields declared with
the generic type, java.lang.Object. For every access to these
fields, PHOSPHOR must insert several instructions to box
or unbox the array, which requires allocating a new con-
tainer each time, and hence, adding significantly to the over-
head. We were particularly pleased with PHOSPHOR’s per-
formance on the three web-server based benchmarks: “tom-
cat,” “tradebeans,” and “tradesoap,” with runtime overhead
of less than 42% for each of these, across all of the JVMs.
This result is very promising due to the immediate applica-
bility of taint tracking to web servers, as discussed in §2.
To compare to other binary-instrumentation based taint
tracking systems, DyTan [9] shows a performance overhead
of 30x in a macro benchmark, with a memory overhead of
240x. LibDFT [18] shows a performance overhead of 1.14-
6x on macro benchmarks. PHOSPHOR showed an average
overhead of 1.5x, ranging overall from 1.03x to 3.19x.
The most applicable system that was available to com-
pare PHOSPHOR to is TaintDroid [12], which used the Caf-
feineMark [25] micro benchmark to measure performance.
Benchmark Oracle - HotSpot 7 Rel. Overhead (Other JVMs) Rel. Overhead (DVM)
Tb (ns) Tp (ns) Rel. Overhead Hotspot 8 IcedTea 7 IcedTea 8 PHOSPHOR TaintDroid
Float 5619.93 7765.39 38.18% 108.01% 37.7% 114.16% 131.22% 63.91%
Logic 1337.95 1340.99 0.23% 0% 0% 0.2% 1.46% 11.19%
Loop 3283.09 4059.94 23.66% 23.4% 22.22% 23.28% 43.89% 63.95%
Method 266.15 642.34 141.35% 140.12% 132.38% 137.58% 9.83% 25.28%
Sieve 6128.46 7062.09 15.23% 12.79% 14.34% 13.64% 27.67% 3.2%
String Buffer 1080.86 3395.57 214.15% 212.91% 215.87% 208.41% 183.27% 30.8%
Average 2952.74 4044.39 72.13% 82.87% 70.42% 82.88% 66.22% 33.06%
Table 2: Runtime duration (in nanoseconds) and overhead for micro benchmarks, showing baseline time (Tb), PHOSPHOR time
(Tp) and relative overhead for Oracle’s HotSpot JVM version 1.7.0 45 and 1.8.0, OpenJDK’s IcedTea JVM version 1.7.0 45
and 1.8.0, and Android’s DVM version 4.3.1. For the DVM, we also show TaintDroid’s overhead (relative to the same baseline
Android configuration).
We compare PHOSPHOR’s performance on CaffeineMark di-
rectly to TaintDroid in the following section.
6.2 Performance: Microbenchmarks
We performed a series of micro benchmarks to further cate-
gorize PHOSPHOR’s runtime performance overhead. Our mi-
cro benchmarks are inspired by the CaffeineMark [25] suite
of micro benchmarks, commonly used by Android develop-
ers – including by the authors of TaintDroid [12]. We mod-
ified these benchmarks to run under Google’s Caliper micro
benchmark tool, so that they could benefit from the frame-
work’s warmup, timing, and validation features (the original
CaffeineMark benchmarks do not contain any warmup phase
and therefore the results can be skewed by JIT compilation).
The “embedded” suite (used in the TaintDroid study) con-
sists of six benchmarks: “Float” (simulates 3D rotation of
objects around a point; uses arrays), “Logic” (contains many
simple branch conditions), “Loop” (contains sorting and se-
quence generation; uses arrays), “Sieve” (uses the sieve of
eratosthenes to find primes; uses arrays) and “String” (per-
forms string concatenation; uses arrays).
Table 2 shows the results of this study, showing the
runtime for PHOSPHOR for Oracle’s HotSpot 7 JVM, and
the runtime overhead for all of the subject JVMs, plus the
Android DVM. We also show our measured overhead of
TaintDroid, relative to the same baseline Android DVM.
PHOSPHOR’s fine-grained array taint tag tracking (i.e., that
it stores a taint tag per-element, rather than a single tag per-
array) caused it to perform somewhat poorer than TaintDroid
in the benchmarks that relied heavily on arrays. Recall that
this optimization will result in a loss in precision for Taint-
Droid, which does not affect PHOSPHOR.
However, in the benchmarks that did not involve sig-
nificant array usage (e.g. “Logic,” “Loop,” and “Method”),
PHOSPHOR outperformed TaintDroid. It would be interest-
ing to perform a followup study by modifying TaintDroid to
also track taint tags per-element, to see which approach is
faster in that case. Another interesting observation from the
micro benchmarks is that the average overhead across these
micro benchmarks for PHOSPHOR (72.13%), is somewhat
higher than its average overhead across the macro bench-
marks (52.06%). Perhaps these less optimal cases occur less
in practice than those cases wherein PHOSPHOR is faster.
Unfortunately we are severely restricted in availability of
macro benchmarks for Android (DaCapo is not easily ported
to Android), and therefore could not perform a macro bench-
mark study comparing TaintDroid with PHOSPHOR.
6.3 Accuracy and Precision
We evaluated the accuracy and precision of PHOSPHOR us-
ing two benchmark suites. First, we wrote our own suite of
unit tests, testing that each of our taint tracking properties (as
described in §4.1) are not violated, for each primitive and
primitive array type, as well as for reference types. PHOS-
PHOR passed all of these tests.
To add additional validity to our claim that PHOSPHOR is
accurate and precise, we also implemented the DroidBench
[13] taint tracking benchmark, removing the components
that were Android specific so that it would run on a desktop
JVM. DroidBench consists of 64 test cases for taint tracking
systems, of which, we found 35 to be Android-specific (test-
ing taint propagation through Android-specific callbacks and
life-cycle events, primarily useful for evaluating static taint
propagation tools), leaving 29 tests. Four of the tests are de-
signed to test taint tracking through implicit flows. PHOS-
PHOR passed all of the data flow tests, failing on the four
implicit flow tests, as expected.
6.4 Threats to Validity
The main threats to validity to our experiments are related
to our claims of portability. We claim that PHOSPHOR is
portable to any JVM, as it only requires modifications to
application byte code and library byte code. However, we
only evaluated its functionality on two versions of two JVMs
(albeit two widely used JVMs): Oracle’s HotSpot JVM and
the OpenJDK IcedTea JVM. Just as both of these JVMs
had tight coupling for several classes, preventing PHOS-
PHOR from adding fields to them to track taint tags, it is cer-
tainly within the realm of possibility that other JVMs have
even more constraints on more classes (such coupling be-
tween class libraries and interpreter are not discussed in the
JVM specification). However, we are confident that if such
cases arose, PHOSPHOR would still be applicable, falling
back to storing taint tags for instances of such classes with
a HashMap, an approach that would still work, though per-
haps with somewhat higher overhead. Moreover, we are con-
fident that our selection of Oracle’s HotSpot JVM (which is
the reference implementation for other JVM implementers)
provides additional validity to our claim.
Although we selected popular, well-accepted macro bench-
marks for evaluating PHOSPHOR, it is certainly possible that
the selected benchmarks are not representative of the sorts of
workloads that would normally require taint tracking. How-
ever, because three of these benchmarks involve workloads
on web servers, and taint tracking has been shown to be
highly applicable to detecting and preventing code injection
attacks in web servers, we believe that the benchmarks are
sufficient.
There are several key limitations to our approach, as
discussed previously in §3.3, most notably that PHOS-
PHOR only tracks data flows, and not control flows (“im-
plicit flows”), much like other well known taint tracking
systems [6, 12, 18]. Note that implicit flow tracking primar-
ily requires static analysis, and its implementation should be
unaffected by PHOSPHOR’s approach to data flow tracking.
Support for implicit flows would be interesting to add as
an optional feature to PHOSPHOR (e.g. DyTan [9] supports
both sorts of tracking), but we consider this to be future
work, outside of the scope of this paper.
Java provides a simple reflection API (also used by Scala)
to access information about Class files, such as the list of
methods available in a class. PHOSPHOR patches this API
to hide all of its changes from applications, however, if an
application directly reads in the byte stream of a Class file
(without using this API) and parses its structure, that ap-
plication will find potentially unexpected artifacts of PHOS-
PHOR in the Class. This scenario arose in our macro bench-
mark study exactly once: in the case of the Scala compiler
(“scalac”). We do not believe that this is a common occur-
rence outside of the scope of compilers, as Java’s reflection
API is widely used.
7. Conclusions
Due to difficulties simultaneously achieving precision, ac-
curacy, and performance, all previous implementations of
dynamic taint analysis for JVM based languages have been
restricted, functioning only within specialized and incom-
plete JVMs, making their deployment difficult. We presented
PHOSPHOR, our approach to providing accurate, precise,
and performant taint tracking within the JVM without re-
quiring any modifications to it, demonstrating its applicabil-
ity to two very popular JVMs: Oracle’s HotSpot and Open-
JDK’s IcedTea, for the two most recent versions: 1.7 and
1.8. Moreover, PHOSPHOR does not require any specialized
operating system or specialized hardware. PHOSPHOR is re-
leased with an open-source license via GitHub [2], and we
hope that it can be used by other researchers to further their
work in fields such as security, debugging and testing.
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A. Appendix: JVM Byte Code Opcode Reference
PHOSPHOR modifies the operation of many byte code instructions by inserting additional instructions around them. This table
lists all byte code instructions supported by the Java Virtual machine, and for each one, a brief description of the change(s) that
PHOSPHOR makes.
Table 3: All JVM byte codes, annotated with descriptive transformation information
Opcode(s) Brief Description PHOSPHOR Modifications
aastore Stores reference to array Removes the taint tag for the index before storing;
if the ref. is to a primitive array, boxes before
storing
aaload Loads reference to array Removes the taint tag for the index to load
anewarray Allocates new array for references If the array type is a mutli-d primitive array,
change to a container type
arraylength Returns length of array as integer Place the tag ”0” just below return val on the
operand stack after execution
areturn Exit a method, returning the object
reference at the top of the stack
If the top of the stack is a primitive array, boxes
the array and its taint tags before return
astore Store an object to a local variable If the variable type is a primitive array, store the
taint tags also to their variable. If the variable type





Loads a value from a primitive array Removes the taint tag for the index to load; loads




Stores a value to a primitive array Removes the taint tag for the index to store to;




Loads a constant to the stack Loads the taint tag ”0” before loading the constant
requested




Xor, Xshl, Xshr, Xushr,
Xxor, lcmp, dcmpl,
dcmpg
Performs binary-operand math on
top two stack elements
Moves taint tags of operands out of way and ORs
them, placing new tag just below the result
dload, fload, iload,
lload




Store a primitive local variable After storing the requested variable, store the taint
tag
dup, dup2, dup2 x1,
dup2 x2, dup x1,
dup x2
Duplicates the top N words on
operand stack, possibly placing un-
der the third or fourth word
Also duplicates the taint tag (if there is one) and
if placing under other elements, places under their
taint tag (if present)
dreturn, ireturn, fre-
turn, lreturn
Exit a method, returning the primi-
tive value at the top of the stack
Boxes the primitive into a container, then executes
ARETURN instead
getfield, getstatic Retrieves the value of an instance
field of an object
If applicable, also retrieves the taint tag just before
performing the getfield/getstatic
if acmpeq, if acmpne Jump if the top two object references
on stack are/aren’t equal
If either operand is a primitive array, pops the taint
tag before executing
if icmplt, if icmpge,
if icmple, if icmple,
if icmpeq, if icmpne
Compare top 2 ints and jumps Pops the taint tag for both integers before execut-
ing
Table 3: All JVM byte codes, annotated with descriptive transformation information
Opcode(s) Brief Description PHOSPHOR Modifications
ifeq, ifne, ifgt, ifge,
ifle, iflt
Compares top 1 int and jumps Pops the taint tag before executing
ifnonnull, ifnull Jump if top reference is/isn’t null If operand is a primitive array, pops taint tag be-
fore executing
instanceof Return 0/1 if the top reference is (or
isn’t) the instance of a requested type
If the operand is a primitive array, pops the taint





Invoke a method, popping the argu-
ments from the stack and placing on
top the return value
If the callee is a primitive array, pops the taint tag
(all cases but invokestatic); Remaps the method
descriptor to include taint tags as necessary; If any
parameter is of type ”Object” but the type being
passed is a primitive array, box it into a container.
After return, if return was a container, then unbox
it
ldc, ldcw, ldc2 w Loads a constant onto the stack If loading a primitive type, load taint tag ”0” on
stack first
lookup/table switch Computed jump Pops the taint tag of the operand before executing
monitorenter Obtain lock on the ref. on stack If the ref. is a primitive array, pops the taint tag
before executing
monitorexit Release lock on the ref. on stack If the ref. is a primitive array, pops the taint tag
before executing
newarray Create a new 1D primitive array of a
given length
Remove the taint for the length of the array; Create
a 1D int array of same length to store taint tags
before executing.
pop, pop2 Removes the top 1 or 2 words from
the stack
If a word being popped is a primitive or primitive
array, also remove its taint tag
putfield, putstatic Stores a value to a field If the value being stored is a primitive or primitive
array, also store taint tag. If storing primitive array
to a field of type ”Object” then box it first
swap Swaps the top two words on the stack If either operand has a taint tag, then ensure that
the tags are swapped with the values
multianewarray Create (and possibly initializes) a
multidimensional array
Removes the taint tag of all operands. If element
type is primitive, then changes to a container type,
and initializes the last dimension if it would have
been otherwise
aconst null Loads the constant “null” onto the
stack
No modification necessary
athrow Pops an exception off of the top of
the stack and throws it
No modification necessary
d2f, d2i, d2l, f2d, f2i,
f2l, i2b, i2c, i2d, i2f,
i2l, i2s, l2d, l2f, l2i
Casts primitive types No modification necessary
dneg, fneg, ineg, lneg Negates a primitive type No modification necessary
goto, jsr, ret Unconditional jump No modification necessary
new Creates a new uninitialized object No modification necessary
return Returns “void” from a method No modification necessary
iinc Increments a local variable No modification necessary
wide Indicates that the next instruction ac-
cesses a local variable with an index
greater than 255
No modification necessary
